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ABSTRACT 
Compensation decisions have important consequences for employees and organizations and 
affect factors such as retention, motivation, and recruitment. Past research has primarily focused 
on mean performance as a predictor of compensation, promoting the implicit assumption that 
alternative aspects of dynamic performance are not relevant. To address this gap in the literature, 
we examined the influence of dynamic performance characteristics on compensation decision in 
the National Basketball Association (NBA). We predicted that, in addition to performance mean, 
performance trend and variability would also affect compensation decisions. Results revealed 
that performance mean and trend, but not variability, were significantly and positively related to 
changes in compensation levels of NBA players. Moreover, trend (but not mean or variability) 
predicted compensation when controlling for future performance, suggesting that organizations 
overweighted trend in their compensation decisions. Theoretical and practical implications are 
discussed.  
 
Compensation; Dynamic performance; Performance trend; Pay-for-performance 
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Compensation decisions are arguably among the most important decisions that 
organizations make. How much to pay their employees has important implications for both 
employees (e.g., their motivation, satisfaction, perceived fairness, and turnover intentions,) and 
organizations (e.g., their effectiveness, ability to recruit and retain talent, and financial 
performance) (Lawler, 1971,1981; Milkovich & Newman, 1996). There are negative 
consequences both for under-compensation and over-compensation: Paying too little can result, 
for example, in increased turnover and reduced motivation, whereas paying too much can result, 
among others, in higher cost and poorer financial performance.  
In order to make effective compensation decisions, organizations often tie compensation 
to performance (“pay-for-performance”). Indeed, a large literature shows a substantial positive 
link between performance and compensation (see Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998). 
Moreover, research indicates more specifically that previous task performance is utilized in 
compensation decisions (Zhou & Martocchio, 2001). Linking pay to performance can provide 
motivation, direction, and reinforcement for employees and should thus facilitate future 
performance (e.g., Locke, Bryan, & Kendall, 1968; Podsakoff, Bommer, Podsakoff, & 
MacKenzie, 2006; Shaw, Duffy, Mitra, Lockhart, & Bowler, 2003).  
Whereas a large portion of the literature on the relation between performance and 
compensation has been cross-sectional in nature, researchers are now calling for an examination 
of dynamism in performance and compensation (Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009; Sturman, 
2007). This is consistent with the fact that employees work over extended periods of time during 
which their performance and compensation tend to change. In the present study, we answer this 
call and extend existing research on the link between performance and compensation by 
addressing an important gap in the existing research literature: the role of performance dynamics 
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in compensation decisions. 
Hypotheses Development: The Influence of Dynamic Performance Characteristics on Changes in 
Compensation Level  
Typically, “true” performance has been defined as the average performance over a certain 
time horizon or number of performance episodes, generally treating anything other than the 
average of performance as noise (Lecerf, Ghisletta, & Jouffray, 2004). Consistent with this 
notion, most research on pay-for-performance has implicitly assumed that “performance” means 
average performance. However, research on “dynamic criteria” has shown that task performance 
tends to be dynamic, that is, lacking stability and being subject to changes over time (e.g., 
Deadrick & Madigan, 1990; Hoffman, Jacobs, & Gerras, 1992; Hulin, Henry, & Noon, 1990; 
Sturman, 2007; Thoresen, Bradley, Bliese, & Thoresen, 2004). There is now a growing 
recognition that performance can have stable and dynamic characteristics (Sturman et al., 2005), 
and that dynamic performance represents theoretically interesting and practically important 
aspects of performance, rather than simply being “noise” (Lecerf et al, 2004; Reb & Greguras, 
2008; Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli, 1988; Sturman, 2007). Indeed, examinations of dynamic 
performance have been helpful in predicting turnover (Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996). 
In examining performance dynamics, past research has paid particular attention to three 
characteristics of dynamic performance: performance mean, variation, and trend (DeNisi & 
Stevens, 1982; Reb & Cropanzano, 2007; Sturman, 2003). These characteristics reflect the fact 
that the stability/dynamic of performance over time is influenced by stable factors (e.g., 
personality) as well as longer-term (e.g., learning) and shorter-term (e.g., moods) changes in 
employees. Research on performance appraisals has shown that raters take dynamic performance 
characteristics into account when evaluating employee performance (Reb & Cropanzano, 2007; 
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Reb & Greguras, 2010).  
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of performance dynamics on 
compensation decisions. Specifically, we address the question whether characteristics of 
dynamic performance other than the mean (in particular, trend and variation) affect 
compensation decisions. In so doing, we address an important gap in the pay-for-performance, 
which has implicitly assumed that performance is best represented by a single variable (mean 
performance). Further, if indeed compensation decisions are influenced by aspects of dynamic 
performance other than the mean, as we expect, the question arises as to whether compensation 
managers give a disproportionately low or high weight to any of the dynamic performance 
characteristics.  
Influence of Performance Mean on Compensation Decisions 
Among the three dynamic criteria, mean performance is perhaps the most salient 
indicator of an employee’s contribution to an organization (Reb & Cropanzano, 2007). Average 
performance smoothes out deviations from the mean that might be due to transitory factors 
beyond the control of the employee, or random fluctuations that are not informative. Indeed, 
decision makers may view such fluctuations as noise to be ignored (Lecerf et al., 2004), instead 
placing the focus on the more stable mean. 
Consistent with this reasoning, past research found that average performance strongly 
predicts variance in pay and reward allocation (Barnes & Morgeson, 2007; Zhou & Martocchio, 
2001). This may not come as a surprise, as typical, or average, performance represents the 
dominant conceptualization of performance (Rushton, Jackson, & Paunonen, 1981). Because of 
these reasons, and consistent with past findings, we hypothesize that higher mean performance 
will lead to positive changes in compensation level. 
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Hypothesis 1: Performance mean will be positively related to compensation change. 
Influence of Performance Trend on Compensation Decisions 
In addition to mean level, performance over time often shows some systematic, 
directional changes. Long-term changes can be due, for example, to changes in employee skills, 
knowledge, or experiences (e.g., Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; 
Schmidt & Hunter, 1992; Quiñones, Ford, & Teachout, 1995). For example, an employee may 
learn more efficient ways of approaching a task and improve his or her task performance over the 
course of months (Sturman, 2003; Sturman & Trevor, 2001). Such long-term changes can be 
captured as trends in performance over time.  
There are reasons to posit that organizations will compensate upward trends more 
favorably than downward trends even given the same mean level of performance. Reb and 
Cropanzano (2007) argued that performance trend is a highly salient Gestalt characteristic of 
dynamic performance and therefore affects raters’ heuristic appraisals of employees. Further, 
raters may extrapolate an improving (deteriorating) performance into strong (weak) future 
performance. This can result in more favorable evaluations and higher compensation for 
employees who show an improving trend, as organizations might expect a higher future return 
from such employees, assuming that the trend does not reverse. Thus, those who perceive a trend 
in performance will expect that trend to continue into expected future performance, a 
phenomenon called naïve extrapolation (Ariely & Carmon, 2003). 
Moreover, people view upward performance trends as suggesting an ability to learn and 
develop skills (Reb & Greguras, 2010), or perhaps to adapt over time to a more successful 
strategy. Given the value that many organizations place on learning, skill development, and 
adaptation (Kraiger, Ford, & Salas, 1993; LePine, 2003), it is reasonable to expect that 
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employees who show an improving trend of performance will be viewed as more valuable 
employees than those with a deteriorating trend, and should be compensated accordingly. 
Finally, research indicates that performance trend influences attributions regarding effort and 
locus of causality. Reb and Greguras (2010) found that positive trends influenced raters to 
indicate such employees as putting forth the greatest effort. Those with high levels of effort will 
likely be judged as highly motivated people. In contrast, those with negative trends were judged 
as putting forth low levels of effort (Reb & Greguras, 2010). Moreover, Reb and Greguras found 
that raters attributed a positive trend to internal factors, such that characteristics of the employee 
were determined to drive their high performance. This suggests that people view a positive trend 
as an indication of positive mastery over the task, whereas a negative trend is viewed as an 
indication of being more at the whim of external factors. 
Thus, those making compensation decisions will expect positive trends to continue 
upward, and will judge those with positive trends as more able to learn, more motivated, and 
more in control over performance outcomes. In contrast, those making compensation decisions 
will expect negative trends to continue downwards, and will judge those with negative trends as 
less able to learn, less motivated, and less in control over performance outcomes.  
Consistent with this reasoning, performance appraisal research has found that employees who 
show improving trends are evaluated more favorably than employees whose performance 
deteriorates over time (with employees who show a flat trend falling in between) (DeNisi & 
Stevens, 1981; Reb & Greguras, 2010). The effect of trend on evaluations of performance has 
been established in both student and manager samples and in Western (US) and Eastern 
(Singapore) samples (Reb & Cropanzano, 2007; Reb & Greguras, 2010).  
Based on the above we hypothesize that performance trend will be positively related to 
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changes in compensation level. 
Hypothesis 2: Performance trend will be positively related to compensation change. 
Influence of Performance Variation on Compensation Decisions 
Long-term, or directional changes over time can be distinguished from short-term 
fluctuations, or unsystematic variation of performance (Sturman, 2007). Such fluctuations may 
be described as performance variation around a longer-term trend. Within-person performance 
variation can be due a variety of factors, including affective state (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) 
and amount of sleep (Barnes, 2011). Between-persons, some individuals may show large 
variation in performance, i.e., are inconsistent, whereas others show little variation, i.e. perform 
consistently around the mean level or a long-term trend.  
There are several reasons to posit that larger performance variation is associated with 
smaller compensation. By definition, it is easier to predict the performance of employees who 
show little performance variability as compared to those who show high variability. 
Organizations tend to value predictability. Employees performing inconsistently can create 
uncertainty and disruptions for team members and other parties dependent on the employee, 
sometimes making it difficult to plan and perform interactively. This increases the risk of 
performance failures, coordination problems, and disrupted activities for other employees who 
are downstream in interdependencies. Depending on the context, especially poor episodes of 
performance may result in lost clients, lost revenue, lost credibility, destroyed equipment, 
injuries, or other forms of loss. Consistent with this reasoning, Hinds, Carley, Krackhardt, and 
Wholey (2000) found that employees prefer predictable work group members.  
Further, inconsistent performance has been found to lead to attributions of negative traits 
(Fox, Bizman, Hoffman, & Oren, 1995). Indeed, the word undependable, which one would 
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expect to be linked to high variability, is generally considered a pejorative label. Empirically, at 
least one study has found high performance variability to be associated with lower pay (Barnes 
& Morgeson, 2007). Organizations may pay higher compensation to more consistent performers 
in an effort to reward and retain these valued employees. Accordingly, we contend that 
performance variability will be negatively related to changes in compensation level. 
Hypothesis 3: Performance variability will be negatively related to compensation change. 
Method 
Sturman (2007) highlights some of the difficulties in designing studies to capture 
dynamic performance trends, as well as the difficulties in measuring dynamic performance 
components. A proper setting to test our hypotheses requires well-defined performance 
objectives, precise measures that minimize measurement error (which might otherwise mask 
performance variability), data that are meticulously captured over a meaningful period of time to 
capture the dynamic components of performance, and compensation managers who clearly have 
access to such performance data. Fortunately, the National Basketball Association (NBA) 
provides exactly this type of setting. While this sample, and certainly compensation amounts, are 
not typical of regular employees, the sample has several distinct advantages for the purpose of 
testing our hypotheses. First, conceptually, performance can be clearly defined over discrete 
performance episodes (a game). Second, from a measurement perspective, the available 
performance data is objective, comprehensively and tracked over time (a crucial factor for this 
study). Further, compensation data is available from both before and after the performance, 
allowing us to examine whether performance dynamics predict changes in performance. Third, 
the performance data is transparently available to team managers who make the actual 
compensation decisions used as dependent variable in this study. 
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Design and Sample 
Past performance data included individual performance drawn from a sample of NBA 
players in each regular-season game played from the 2000–2001 season through the 2003–2004 
season. A season consists of 82 games. The range of games a player participated in ranged from 
42 to 244. In order to detect longer-term performance trends in addition to variation, we 
considered the three seasons before a player signed a new contract. Thus, players with less than 3 
seasons of performance data were not included. Compensation level data were based on contracts 
signed in the off-seasons (NBA Basketball Statistics, 2005). Each contract signed during this 
time span was matched with the performance data in the three years immediately prior to the new 
contract. Data were available indicating when a contract expired as well as the length of that 
contract, allowing us to determine when a new contract was signed.  We could only include 
players in the sample who had already played on an earlier NBA contract because our dependent 
variable was change in performance. We also included only the first new contract signing per 
player in order to avoid dependency in the sample created through repeat entries.  
Our final sample included n = 131 new contracts over this time period that met our 
inclusion criteria. These employee contracts were nested within 29 franchises. Average age of 
players in our sample was 29 years, and average experience playing in the NBA was 6.85 years. 
Measures 
Barnes and Morgeson (2007) found that although there are multiple behaviors that are 
important in basketball, points scored accounted for over half of the variance in compensation. 
This indicates that these organizations focus on points scored as the primary criterion on which 
NBA players are evaluated and compensated. Accordingly, we used points scored as our main 
measure of performance. 
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Performance mean. We operationalized performance mean as the mean number of points 
scored per game over the three seasons preceding the compensation decision.  
Performance trend. We measured performance trend as the linear change over the three 
seasons prior to the new contract. We first gathered points scored per game over this time span. 
We then subjected these data to a linear regression for each player with game number as 
predictor of points scored each game. If scores improved (deteriorated) over the three seasons, 
this resulted in a positive (negative) regression coefficient. We used each player’s 
unstandardized regression coefficient as a measure of performance trend. 
Performance variability. We measured performance variability as the standard error in 
the regression utilized to obtain performance trend. A high standard error indicates a high 
variability in the game-to-game performance of each player, whereas a low standard error 
indicates low variability. 
Change in compensation level. Each player signs a contract to work for an organization 
specifying their salary. To capture percent change in salary, we subtracted the salary of the old 
labor contract for each player from the salary of the new contract for each player, and divided the 
total by their salary of the old labor contract. 
Control variables. We also included the control variables of age, and number of years in 
the league, which were significantly related to NBA salaries in previous research (Barnes & 
Morgeson, 2007). Additionally, we included the salary from the previous year for each player as 
a control variable. Players signing labor contracts could either re-sign with the same team or sign 
a contract with a different team, so we controlled for whether or not the contract was with a new 
team. Finally, in order to account for differences in opportunity to score, we also included team 
role. The same database providing the performance data also indicate whether each player played 
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the position of guard, forward, or center; we created dummy variables for forward and center. 
Analysis 
In our sample, individuals were nested within teams. Because teams may differ in how 
they make compensation decisions, this violates Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis 
assumptions about independence of observations. Indeed, there was a significant ICC(1) value 
for percent change in compensation (.20, p<.01), indicating significant differences between 
teams. Accordingly, we conducted a multilevel analysis, with players nested within teams. We 
used Hierarchical Linear Modeling (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), with a variable at Level 2 
indicating which individual signed with which team, and all other variables at Level 1. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study variables. As 
can be seen, across all players compensation increased about 1% from previous contracts. Mean 
performance was close to 10 points per game and there was no strong upward or downward trend 
over time when averaged across all players (M = 0.004). Performance mean and trend showed 
significant zero-order correlations with change in compensation of .19 (p<.05) and .59 (p<.01), 
respectively. This is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2 and also suggests that performance trend 
may have a stronger influence on change in compensation than performance mean. 
Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis 1 states that mean performance positively influences change in compensation 
level. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, our analysis shows that performance mean had a positive 
effect on change in compensation level (β=.35, p<.001; see Table 2).  
 Hypothesis 2 states that performance trend has a positive effect on change in 
compensation level. As Table 2 indicates, performance trend positively influenced change in 
14 
 
compensation level (β= .35, p<.01). This is consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3 states that performance variability negatively relates to change in 
compensation level. As indicated by Table 2, this prediction was not supported (β = .04).  
Supplemental Analysis 
 An interesting question that can be addressed with this sample is whether or not 
compensation managers place an irrationally high amount of weight on any of the 
conceptualizations of performance in making compensation decisions. We assume that 
compensation managers are trying to match compensation to future performance. We were able 
to obtain actual future performance (throughout the duration of the new labor contract of each 
player). Therefore, we entered future performance as a control variable and examined the 
influence of each conceptualization of performance on change in compensation. As indicated by 
Table 3, controlling for future performance eliminates the effect of performance mean, which 
drops from a moderately strong effect (β =.35, p<.01) to non-significant (β =.04). However, 
controlling for future performance only partly eroded the effect of performance trend, which 
dropped very little, from .35 (p<.01) to .31 (p<.01). Thus, managers were weighting performance 
trend above and beyond any link with actual future performance.  
Discussion 
 The present study extends our understanding of the relation between performance and 
pay. The pay-for-performance literature has implicitly assumed that performance means average 
performance only. Drawing on work on dynamic performance (Reb & Cropanzano, 2007; 
Sturman, 2007) we challenged this assumption and argued, first, that dynamic performance is 
characterized by important aspects other than the mean and, second, that these other aspects of 
dynamic performance influence compensation decisions. Specifically, we predicted that 
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performance mean, variability and trend would all influence change in compensation level. We 
used a particularly well-suited sample, NBA players, to test our hypotheses, utilizing the benefits 
of well-defined, objectively and comprehensively measured performance and compensation data 
that were captured over an extended period of time and clearly available to compensation 
managers.  
Replicating past research (e.g., Barnes & Morgeson, 2007; Zhou & Martocchio, 2001) we 
found that average performance affected compensation level such that the higher the average 
performance the higher the percentage increase in compensation from the previous contract. 
Most interestingly, the present study showed that performance trend positively influenced 
compensation level change over and above performance mean. The more a player’s performance 
improved (deteriorated) over time, the more (less) compensation he received. 
By showing how an increasing trend leads to higher compensation awards in new 
contracts, the present research contributes to our understanding of how organizations use 
dynamic performance information to make important decisions. Thus, these findings provide 
empirical evidence to reject the implicit assumptions in the pay-for-performance literature that 
performance can be captured entirely via mean performance and that the only aspect of 
performance that matters in compensation decisions is the performance mean. These findings 
also link to and complement research on performance appraisals. Similar to our research, 
research on performance appraisals has begun to examine the influence of dynamic performance 
characteristics. This research has shown that that performance trend affects subjective ratings of 
performance as well as attributions of employee ability and effort (e.g., DeNisi & Stevens, 1982;; 
Reb & Cropanzano, 2007; Reb & Greguras, 2010). We consider the consistency in results across 
these domains as encouraging, especially given the differences in methodology used: Whereas 
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research on the effects of dynamic performance on appraisals has relied on laboratory 
experiments using hypothetical performance data, the present study examined how actual 
dynamic performance influenced real compensation decisions amounting to millions of dollars. 
The present study did not find an effect of performance variability on compensation 
changes. This finding is inconsistent with the results reported in Barnes and Morgeson (2007), 
who did find such an effect in a similar study of NBA players’ contractual compensation levels. 
One possible explanation is the different lengths of time involved in these studies. Whereas 
Barnes and Morgeson examined a single season, our study examined three consecutive seasons. 
It may be possible that performance variability plays out differently over longer periods of time, 
such that performance sampling error that might appear in the short term as variability washes 
out over more time. However, it should also be noted that when considering the literature on the 
effects of dynamic performance on performance appraisals, the results concerning performance 
variability have been similarly mixed. Whereas some studies (e.g., Reb & Cropanzano, 2007; 
Scott & Hamner, 1975) found little support for an effect of variability when studied together with 
mean and trend, other studies (e.g., Reb & Greguras, 2010) did find an effect, such that small 
variation led to more favorable evaluations. Clearly, more research is needed to examine the 
conditions under which performance variability significantly affects organizational decisions. 
In addition to testing specific hypotheses, we also conducted supplemental analyses for 
research questions we did not have enough grounds to posit theoretically-derived hypotheses. An 
especially interesting finding from these supplemental analyses was that performance trend 
seemed to be given an undeservedly high amount of weight in compensation decisions. 
Specifically, in these analyses we controlled for future performance when predicting change in 
compensation level. In order to avoid over-paying, an increase in compensation based on higher 
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performance mean or more improving trend is only justified by a matching future performance. 
This implies that when statistically controlling for future performance, the effects on 
compensation change observed for performance mean and trend should become non-significant. 
Consistent with this reasoning, controlling for future performance did eliminate the effect of 
performance mean on change in compensation. This suggests that compensation managers gave 
appropriate weight to performance mean. However, controlling for future performance only 
slightly eroded the influence of performance trend on change in compensation. This suggests that 
compensation managers, on average, placed an inappropriately high amount of weight on 
performance trend. Thus, taken together our results suggest that not only are compensation 
managers taking performance trend into account (Hypothesis 2), unlike the influence of 
performance mean, this weight is larger than deserved. This finding is exploratory in nature, so 
caution should be taken in making strong inferences from it. Clearly, more research is needed to 
replicate and extend these suggestive initial findings.   
A second interesting finding from our supplemental analyses was the significant variance 
between franchises in the degree to which performance variability and performance trend 
influenced compensation decisions. This suggests interesting future research directions on 
moderating variables. For example, there may be rater effects that moderate the influence of 
performance attributes on compensation decisions. Moreover, aside from experience, some 
people making compensation decisions may naturally have an optimistic bias that leads them to 
over-project past performance trends into the future, whereas others may be less likely to project 
performance trends into the future. Additionally, there may be differences among organizational 
cultures in how highly performance trend is valued. Some organizations may be especially likely 
to highly weight an upward performance trend. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
A limitation of this research is the nature of the sample. NBA players are quite different 
from regular company employee in both their compensation level and their ability to perform at 
very high levels. NBA players’ performance is also publicly available and scrutinized more than 
in most other careers. Similarly, their compensation data are publicly available, which is not 
always the case with other types of employees. Some might also question whether or not 
inferences made from sports teams will generalize to other industries and jobs. All this puts 
potential limits to the generalizability of the findings from this sample to samples in other 
contexts. Future research is required to examine the effect of dynamic performance 
characteristics on compensation decisions in other samples.  
The main purpose of our study was not, however, to generate a generalizable parameter 
estimate that can be applied to the full population of compensation managers. Instead, our 
purpose was to test the theoretically-derived predictions that performance trend and variability 
would affect changes in compensation level. From this perspective, some of the limitations of 
our sample also serve as strengths. The data in our sample was highly objective and publicly 
available. The financial rewards for performing well were very large. The data was longitudinal, 
allowing for the study of real-world performance trends over a three-year period (as compared to 
literature in evaluations of dynamic performance that used hypothetical performance data (e.g., 
Reb & Greguras, 2010). The performance periods were also temporally antecedent to 
compensation decisions, an important element in establishing causal direction. All these factors 
allow for a clean test of our theoretical hypotheses. 
Another characteristic of our sample that was both a strength and a weakness is that it 
used objective performance data. This is a strength because it allowed us to examine dynamism 
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in performance in a very precise manner. However, it eliminates issues associated with the 
subjective performance evaluation that occurs in many organizations. Future research should 
examine a broad range of employee evaluation criteria, including subjective evaluations. 
Performance data from our sample were publicly available. Such transparency in 
performance may help to strengthen the link between performance and pay, not only within the 
organization but also across organizations. Indeed, one means by which a basketball player in the 
NBA can negotiate a higher compensation level is to leverage an offer from another team. Such 
offers from other organizations are likely facilitated by publicly available performance data. 
There are other types of careers and organizations for which performance data are either public 
or semi-public. For example, research productivity of professors is both monitored and public. 
However, there are other settings in which there is less transparency. Thus, how public and 
transparent performance rating systems are may be another important moderator of the 
relationships between performance and compensation. 
In the NBA, there are limitations to how much players can be compensated. For any 
given player, there is a maximum salary. This restricts the range in compensation, which 
generally attenuates relationships between variables. Thus, our findings are likely a conservative 
test of our hypotheses. Moreover, teams have a salary cap limiting the total compensation that 
they can provide, with a few exceptions to the rules (such as the “mid-level exemption”). Teams 
can go above this salary cap, but must pay a penalty to do so. Although other organizations do 
not have the same salary regulation system as the NBA, most organizations operate in a fiscally 
finite environment which places parallel limitations on salaries. Similarly, the complexity faced 
by NBA compensation managers trying to work within this system may not be identical to 
constraints faced by other organizations, but compensation managers in other organizations may 
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also face high complexity in making compensation decisions. 
Extending beyond this research, future research should examine other personnel 
decisions that are influenced by performance trends and variability. A logical next step would be 
to examine promotion decisions. It is reasonable to expect that promotion decisions would be 
influenced by performance trends in the same manner that performance evaluations and 
compensation decisions are. Those with positive and steep trends may be perceived as rising 
stars, and thus promoted faster, even though their improvement was due to a low starting level. 
Similarly, researchers should examine how trend and variability in other behavior outside of task 
performance—like helping behavior (Barnes, Hollenbeck, Wagner, DeRue, Nahrgang, & 
Schwind, 2008)—impact performance-based compensation.  
Practical Implications 
Our findings have several important practical implications. In the context of 
compensation, previous conceptualizations of performance were somewhat incomplete and 
should be modified to include performance trends. When making compensation decisions, 
managers need to understand what variables influence the decision-making process. Managers 
may not realize that they are implicitly projecting performance trends into the future, and basing 
their compensation decisions on such trends. Such projections may be overly optimistic, leading 
to inflated compensation of employees who initially show improvement. Finally, compensation 
policies are likely to shape employee behaviors and performance. Organizations that reward 
performance trends may encourage their employees to artificially lower their performance so as 
to leave room for improvement in the future. Organizations should closely examine their policies 
and patterns to make sure they are rewarding the types of behaviors that they want from their 
employees.  
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Study Variables 
 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. New Teama 0.55 0.50 
             2. Guardb 0.41 0.49 .14 
           3. Forwardc 0.39 0.49 -.16 -.67** 
           4. Centerd 0.20 0.40 .03 -.42** -.40** 
          5. Age (years) 29.00 4.16 .23** .03 .00 -.03 
         6. Experience (years) 6.85 3.42 .14 .07 -.02 -.06 .89** 
        7. Previous Salary (millions) 4.12 4.75 -.09 -.15 .10 .06 .32** .40** 
       8. Performance Mean T-1e 9.82 6.19 -.34** .08 .04 -.15 -.24** -.09 .49** 
      9. Performance Mean T-2f 9.62 6.16 -.32** .12 .02 -.17 -.05 .10 .60** .85** 
     10. Performance Mean T-3g 9.37 6.28 -.22** .16 -.02 -.17 .04 .18* .63** .77** .89** 
    11. Performance Mean 
Overall 9.84 5.85 -.31** .12 .04 -.20* -.13 .02 .57** .93** .95** .92** 
   12. Performance Variability 0.008 0.005 .17* .09 -.07 -.03 -.19* -.18* -.06 -.08 -.08 -.06 -.05 
  13. Performance Trend 0.004 0.03 -.18* -.10 .06 .05 -.41** -.40** -.18** .33** -.06 -.31** .03 .10 
 14. Percent Change in 
Compensation 0.98 2.17 -.25** -.10 .17 -.08 -.48** -.45** -.29** .36** .09 -.06 .19* .04 .59** 
n=131 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
a. New Team is dummy coded as 0 if the player re-signed with the same team and 1 if the player signed with a new team 
b. Guard is dummy coded 1 for guards and 0 for all other positions (forwards and centers) 
c. Forward is dummy coded 1 for forwards and 0 for all other positions (guards and centers) 
d. Center is dummy coded 1 for centers and 0 for all other positions (guards and forwards) 
e. Performance Mean T-1refer to the season’s performance mean one year prior to signing the contract 
f. Performance Mean T-2 refers to the season’s performance mean two years prior to signing the contract 
g. Performance Mean T-3 refers to the season’s performance mean three years prior to signing the contract  
Note. Performance mean, variability, and trend are calculated from points scored per game.  
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Table 2: HLM Results Predicting Change in Compensation Level 
 
Fixed Effects: 
Predictor β s.e. t 
Intercept .04 .12 0.34 
New Teama -.17 .08 -2.07 
Forward vs. Guardb .06 .09 0.61 
Center vs. Guardc .08 .11 0.74 
Age .05 .12 0.42 
Experience -.12 .09 -1.26 
Previous Salary -.32 .05 -6.43** 
Performance Mean .35 .06 5.54** 
Performance Variability .04 .06 0.69 
Performance Trend .35 .08 4.16** 
Random Effects: 
Predictor 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Component χ2 
Intercept .32 .10 47.54 
Performance Mean .05 .00 14.00 
Performance Variability .11 .01 28.10* 
Performance Trend .35 .12 37.89** 
n=131 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
a. New Team is dummy coded as 0 if the player re-signed with the same team and 1 if the player 
signed with a new team 
b. Forward vs. Guard is dummy coded 1 for forwards and 0 for all other positions (guards and 
centers) and refers to the difference between Forward and Guard. 
c. Center vs. Guard is dummy coded 1 for centers and 0 for all other positions (guards and 
forwards) and refers to the difference between Center and Guard. 
Note. Performance mean, variability, and trend are calculated from points scored per game.  
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Table 3: HLM Results Predicting Change in Compensation, Controlling for Future Performance 
 
Fixed Effects: 
Predictor β s.e. t 
Intercept .01 .11 0.11 
New Teama -.18 .07 -2.46* 
Forward vs. Guardb .10 .09 1.16 
Center vs. Guardc .20 .10 1.95 
Age .15 .13 1.20 
Experience -.12 .10 -1.22 
Previous Salary -.28 .04 -6.34** 
Future Performance .39 .12 3.11** 
Performance Mean .04 .10 0.35 
Performance Variability .10 .06 1.58 
Performance Trend .31 .08 4.01** 
Random Effects: 
Predictor 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance 
Component χ2 
Intercept .32 .10 51.71** 
Performance Mean .06 .00 14.45 
Performance Variability .13 .02 28.61* 
Performance Trend .33 .11 36.15** 
n=131 
*p<.05 
**p<.01 
a. New Team is dummy coded as 0 if the player re-signed with the same team and 1 if the player 
signed with a new team 
b. Forward vs. Guard is dummy coded 1 for forwards and 0 for all other positions (guards and 
centers) and refers to the difference between Forward and Guard. 
c. Center vs. Guard is dummy coded 1 for centers and 0 for all other positions (guards and 
forwards) and refers to the difference between Center and Guard. 
Note. Performance mean, variability, and trend are calculated from points scored per game.  
 
 
 
